b'C H A P T E R 18T H E S H A W E F F E CT . . .Aerojet president Chuck Rice tried to tives, this informal system has, in a explain the general upheaval in morale period of less than one year, beenand the impact of Shaws new proce- replaced by a highly formalized systemdures to Idaho congressman Orval that places primary reliance onHansen: u n s w eving adherence to a set of inter - rlocking pro c e d ues and r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e sIn the past, reactor and enviro n m e n t a l that have been subjected to multiplesafety was derived from experienced reviews by boards of specialists. Thee x p ets working together as a loosely writing of pro c u rement specifications rknit team, each member of which expecthas become a job for the skilled engi- -ed the remaining members to perform neer rather than the purchasing agent.the appropriate functions at the appro - C a refully documented engineering stud -priate time without clear cut lines of ies have replaced the quick fix by theresponsibility and delegated authorities.maintenance man.2 4In response to AEC desires ande d cir-INEEL 69-6280 Meanwhile, the STEP program opera-tors had managed to carry out usefulwork in spite of difficulties. Theydeveloped computer models predictingthe behavior of coolant in a LOCA.Among other experimental devices,they built a simulated reactor calledSemiscale to help understand howcoolant water would behave as itdepressurized after a pipe broke. Thisprocess was called a blowdown.Blowdown tests and computer analysisof the simulated accidents led to com-puter programs, called codes, capableof predicting the performance of back-up cooling systems during a blowdown.The codes originated at the NRTS withthe help of the INEL SupercomputingCenter (ISC), which was built in 1968. 25Above. Semiscale was a simulated reactor.Instrumentation leads leave head of the core. Left.Semiscale blowdown test, 1968, simulated a breakin a coolant pipe.INEEL 68-31791 8 1'